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William D. Blake, Joseph Francesco Cozza, David A. Armstrong II
Elements in Comparative Political Behaviour, Cambridge University Press, 2025
Elements in Comparative Political Behaviour, Cambridge University Press, 2025
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APA
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Blake, W. D., Cozza, J. F., & Armstrong II, D. A. (2025). The Social Foundations of Constitutional Innovation (under contract). Cambridge University Press.
Chicago/Turabian
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Blake, William D., Joseph Francesco Cozza, and David A. Armstrong II. The Social Foundations of Constitutional Innovation (under Contract). Elements in Comparative Political Behaviour. Cambridge University Press, 2025.
MLA
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Blake, William D., et al. The Social Foundations of Constitutional Innovation (under Contract). Cambridge University Press, 2025.
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@book{blake2025a,
title = {The Social Foundations of Constitutional Innovation (under contract)},
year = {2025},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
series = {Elements in Comparative Political Behaviour},
author = {Blake, William D. and Cozza, Joseph Francesco and Armstrong II, David A.}
}
Social capital studies emerged in political science 20 years ago to impact the scholarship of political behavior and institutional performance. As citizens build interpersonal networks and ascribe to the accompanying norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness (see Putnam 2000, 19), they become more likely to vote and to engage in other civic activities (e.g., Claibourn & Martin, 2007; Jennings & Stoker, 2004). Social capital varies dramatically across contexts and over time, and these differences create different policy outcomes. Higher levels of social capital facilitate citizens making policy demands on government, spurring innovations (Putnam 1993, 82-120; Rice and Sumberg 1997). Yet, no study to date has examined whether the behavioral effects of social capital affects the performance of constitutions, one of the most fundamental institutions in the democratic world. This Element analyzes the social determinants of constitutional innovation.
Constitutional amendment rules impose high negotiation and decision costs, yet there is no scholarly consensus on whether the stringency of amendment rules affects the pace of constitutional reform. Some studies suggest that rigid amendment rules reduce constitutional amendment rates (Dixon & Holden, 2012; Fruhstorfer & Hein, 2021; Lijphart, 2012; Lutz, 1994; Negretto, 2012; Tsebelis, 2022), while others produced null results (Ferejohn, 1997; Ginsburg & Melton, 2015; Lorenz, 2005; Rasch & Congleton, 2006). One reason for this disagreement is that these studies rely on a strong assumption that social capacity to navigate amendment rules is constant across space and time.
By contrast, we argue that this social capacity varies by civic connectedness. Drawing upon previous studies that find social capital mitigates transaction costs (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995), our theory outlines the myriad ways in which the trust and civic activity produced by interpersonal networks help elites, social movements, and ordinary citizens solve the collective action problems associated with constitutional reform.
We test our theory in different contexts using a variety of measures, methods, and units of analysis. Our cross-sectional, longitudinal, experimental, and qualitative analyses reach similar conclusions: social capital provides a necessary but not a sufficient condition for constitutional amendments. While low social capital levels are strongly associated with infrequent amendment, we do not claim high social capital levels lead to high amendment rates. A set of idiosyncratic factors may ultimately determine the success of any specific amendment proposal, but these factors may only come into play when a polity is trusting and participatory. In other words, by reducing transaction costs, social capital creates an environment more conducive to constitutional reform.
Constitutional amendment rules impose high negotiation and decision costs, yet there is no scholarly consensus on whether the stringency of amendment rules affects the pace of constitutional reform. Some studies suggest that rigid amendment rules reduce constitutional amendment rates (Dixon & Holden, 2012; Fruhstorfer & Hein, 2021; Lijphart, 2012; Lutz, 1994; Negretto, 2012; Tsebelis, 2022), while others produced null results (Ferejohn, 1997; Ginsburg & Melton, 2015; Lorenz, 2005; Rasch & Congleton, 2006). One reason for this disagreement is that these studies rely on a strong assumption that social capacity to navigate amendment rules is constant across space and time.
By contrast, we argue that this social capacity varies by civic connectedness. Drawing upon previous studies that find social capital mitigates transaction costs (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995), our theory outlines the myriad ways in which the trust and civic activity produced by interpersonal networks help elites, social movements, and ordinary citizens solve the collective action problems associated with constitutional reform.
We test our theory in different contexts using a variety of measures, methods, and units of analysis. Our cross-sectional, longitudinal, experimental, and qualitative analyses reach similar conclusions: social capital provides a necessary but not a sufficient condition for constitutional amendments. While low social capital levels are strongly associated with infrequent amendment, we do not claim high social capital levels lead to high amendment rates. A set of idiosyncratic factors may ultimately determine the success of any specific amendment proposal, but these factors may only come into play when a polity is trusting and participatory. In other words, by reducing transaction costs, social capital creates an environment more conducive to constitutional reform.