William D. Blake

Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates

Journal article

William D. Blake, Joseph Francesco Cozza, David A. Armstrong II, Amanda Friesen
American Political Science Review, vol. 118(2), 2024, pp. 1075-83
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055423000606
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APA   Click to copy
Blake, W. D., Cozza, J. F., Armstrong II, D. A., & Friesen, A. (2024). Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates. American Political Science Review, 118(2), 1075–1083. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000606

Chicago/Turabian   Click to copy
Blake, William D., Joseph Francesco Cozza, David A. Armstrong II, and Amanda Friesen. “Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates.” American Political Science Review 118, no. 2 (2024): 1075–83.

MLA   Click to copy
Blake, William D., et al. “Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates.” American Political Science Review, vol. 118, no. 2, 2024, pp. 1075–83, doi:10.1017/S0003055423000606.

BibTeX   Click to copy 

@article{blake2024a,
  title = {Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates},
  year = {2024},
  issue = {2},
  journal = {American Political Science Review},
  pages = {1075-83},
  volume = {118},
  doi = {10.1017/S0003055423000606},
  author = {Blake, William D. and Cozza, Joseph Francesco and Armstrong II, David A. and Friesen, Amanda}
}
Why are some constitutions amended more frequently than others? The literature provides few clear answers, as some scholars focus on institutional factors, whereas others emphasize amendment culture. We bridge this divide with new theoretical and empirical insights. Using data from democratic constitutions worldwide and U.S. state constitutions, we examine how social capital reduces the transaction costs imposed by amendment rules. The results indicate that constitutional rigidity decreases amendment frequency, but group membership, civic activism, and political trust can offset the effect of amendment rules. Our findings have important implications for scholars in public law, constitutional and democratic theory, and social movements.
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